























Centre for Research in Applied Economics, 
School of Economics and Finance 
Curtin Business School 
Curtin University of Technology 




    
 
 
Economic Governance of Railways in a Federation 
 
Nick Wills-Johnson 
Centre for Research in Applied Economics 
Curtin Business School 
Curtin University 





Until recently, Australia’s State Government-owned railways operated almost entirely 
within their home states.  This has begun to change, in response to the new dynamics 
unleashed by economic and structural reforms which began in the 1990s.  The 
economic regulatory system that governs third party access to track infrastructure is 
still a mix of State and Federal regulation, which has lead to calls for greater 
consistency.  However, it is not clear how much centralisation is optimal.  This paper 
examines railway governance from an historical and a functional perspective, and 
argues that the best approach is not technocratic, but institutional.    
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Economic Governance of Railways in a Federation 
Introduction 
Dean Bailey, a former professor at the University of Melbourne Law School 
suggested in a speech to his US colleagues that, “this matter of economic regulation 
constitutes the insoluble dilemma of federalism" whilst Justice Stone of Minnesota 
admitted that interstate commerce was a “nut (he) did not know how to crack” (Ross, 
1943, p888).  There is much truth in both of these characterisations of economic 
regulation when viewed from the perspective of constitutional law, and the date of the 
quotations suggests the issue is not new.  The economic boundaries of railways rarely 
fit the political boundaries of the jurisdictions within which they operate, and there is 
thus a tendency to move towards centralised control, to match the centralising 
tendency of the railways themselves.  At the same time, however, the adverse impacts 
of railways which regulation tries to address are often local, leading to calls for local 
supervision.  Too much of either form of control renders governance unstable.  The 
art of railway policy involves striking an appropriate balance between centralisation 
and fragmentation.  This paper seeks to contribute by examining both the history of 
railway governance and the haulage tasks it performs in Australia today.  It finds that 
the art if not in finding the right balance between centralisation and fragmentation, but 
in developing an institutional framework within which the balance-point can evolve.   
 
Section Two of this paper outlines the current state of play in terms of economic 
regulation of Australia’s railways, briefly discussing the costs and benefits of a 
federated system.  Section Three looks at historical responses to the same governance 
questions Australia faces today.  Section Four examines Australian railways from the 
perspective of their haulage tasks to ascertain differences between the governance 
each type needs and how conflicts might be resolved.  Section Five makes some 
conclusions about the way forward. 
The Regulatory State of Play 
Operationally, rail has always performed the same task; transporting freight and 
passengers in the most efficient manner possible.  However, public policy has 
expected railways to perform other roles, almost from their inception.  These have 
included; consolidating empires, supporting regional development, advancing social 
welfare, supporting political integration, improving labour relations and supporting 
sustainable environmental development.  More recently, in Australia and Europe, rail 
has been called upon to improve competition in the transport sector.  This is important 
for the economic governance of railways for it introduces two new elements to the 
railways not seen in Australia prior to the 1990s: 
• Treatment of the above (trains) and below (track and signalling infrastructure) rail 
components of the business as separate entities within one organisation or 
divested into two separate organisations, with the latter being a form of common 
property accessible to all train operators. 
• Regulation of prices (for access to track) by a third party economic regulator 
independent to the industry. 
 
Neither element is particularly new.  The very first railways were conceived as multi-
user infrastructure like extant toll-roads.  However, it soon became apparent that the 
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engineering characteristics of railways (limited ability for trains to pass each other and 
poor brakes on early trains) mitigated towards vertical integration.  Lardner (1855) 
provides a detailed account of this history.  Regulation of price began in the UK with 
Gladstone’s Railway Act of 1844 and its “Parliamentary Trains” (Harding, 1848) and 
in a more comprehensive fashion in Continental Europe with French Railway 
Concessions in the 1850s (see Dobbin, 1994).  Regulation of price in the US began 
with the Granger Laws in the 1870s, discussed in more detail below. 
 
In Australia, economic regulation of railways has a much shorter history.  Until very 
recently, Australia’s railways were owned and managed by government.1 This 
brought with it a large number of non-commercial objectives which impeded the 
efficient operation of the railways.  By the 1980s, Australia’s railways had become 
moribund, crushed under debts of $3.7 billion (BTCE, 1995 - 2005 dollars) and in 
need of significant reform if they were to survive.  The Industry Commission (1991) 
divides the reforms which followed into two phases.  During the 1980s, the railways 
engaged in internal reforms which improved productivity but which did not change 
their structure.  For example, excess workers were shed, lines were closed, non-
profitable traffic was abandoned and government owners allowed the railways to set 
their prices on a commercial basis.  By the early 1990s, these reforms had largely 
played out, and policymakers began to explore structural reform of the railways.  This 
somewhat uneven process involved horizontal separation of their businesses into the 
potentially profitable freight services and the public service of passenger rail 
provision.  In some cases (FreightCorp in NSW, National Rail and Westrail in WA) 
these freight businesses were eventually sold to the private sector, whilst in others 
(QR) the government-owned businesses were corporatised. 
 
Structural reform also involved vertical separation, either by ring fencing (WA, 
Victoria and Queensland) or by divestment into a separate company (NSW and 
nationally), and the provision of access to track infrastructure by third parties.  
Management of track infrastructure was privatised in Victoria, SA, Tasmania and 
WA, but Victoria and Tasmania later bought back the infrastructure from its lessees.  
The notion behind separation was that rail consisted of a natural monopoly 
component, the track, and a potentially competitive component, the trains themselves.  
Moreover, by providing access to third party train providers, policymakers thought 
they might motivate competition in the above-rail sector, and improve the efficiency 
of the industry as a whole.  Given the natural monopoly nature of the below-rail 
infrastructure, this access would need to be regulated. 
 
However, development of regulated third party access was uneven.  The States were 
reforming at different speeds and developed their own regimes.  WA, Queensland and 
NSW put their regimes to the National Competition Commission (NCC) for 
certification as to their ‘effectiveness’ in 1999, but only NSW was certified, and then 
only temporarily.  The idea was that, rather than half a dozen different regimes 
developing, each regime would adopt one consistent regime based on that being 
developed by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC).  
However, the States were not prepared to sign up to a regime still under development, 
and hence fragmentation has remained.  Table One shows the current state of play. 
                                                 
1 This excludes the iron ore railways of the Pilbara, the sugar railways of Queensland, and some other 
smaller private lines.  These were not the focus of reform in the 1990s, although the NCC is 
endeavouring to impose third party access on the iron ore railways at present. 
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Table One: Australian Rail Access Regulators 
Regulator Jurisdiction 
ACCC National track and NSW non-urban track (see footnote 20) 
Queensland Competition Authority Queensland 
WA Economic Regulation Authority WA south west (WestNet Rail and PTA track) 
Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal 
(IPART) 
NSW (metropolitan area only) 
Victorian Essential Services Commission Victoria 
South Australian Essential Services 
Commission 
South Australian track and Tarcoola-Darwin railway 
 
Not only are there multiple access regulators, but there are also three ways in which a 
piece of railway track can enter the sphere of regulated access: 
• It can be made subject to a State-based regime. 
• It can be made party to a voluntary access agreement filed with the ACCC under 
Part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act. 
• It can be subject to declaration as ‘nationally significant infrastructure’ by the 
National Competition Commission, whereupon railway track owners are required 
to develop an access agreement. 
 
Most access occurs through State-based regimes.  The exceptions to this are the 
Australian Rail Track Corporation’s (ARTC) interstate track, and the Tarcoola-
Darwin Railway, which is operated by Freightlink and which had its access regime 
certified by the NCC in February 2000 as part of the public-private partnership under 
which the line was constructed.  The former is regulated by the ACCC and the latter 
by the South Australian Essential Services Commission. 
 
Three different paths to regulated access is problematic not just for its diversity, but 
also because it provides scope for regime shopping.  In particular, track which is 
covered by an uncertified State regime could formerly be subject to declaration by the 
NCC or an undertaking by the ACCC.  For example, in February 2002, Freight 
Australia, frustrated by the difficulties in its dispute with the Victorian regulator (see 
below) submitted its track for declaration with the NCC.  At the time, not only was 
the track subject to a Victoria State-based regime, but the regime itself was before the 
NCC for certification.  Prevention of regime shopping has been enhanced by recent 
amendments to the Trade Practices Act (the Trade Practices Amendment (National 
Access Regime) Act 2006) which prohibit the ACCC from accepting an undertaking 
on infrastructure which is already subject to an effective State regime, and the Council 
of Australian Governments (CoAG) recently agreed that all State access regimes 
would be put to the NCC for certification by 2010 (see below). 
 
Regulators in Australia have approached the issue of regulatory diversity in the same 
way that their counterparts in the US did a century ago; they meet regularly and 
discuss how they can promote grater consistency in regulatory practice.  The result 
has been some convergence in recent years, but in reality, the regimes were not 
particularly different at the outset.  In each regime, the regulator may determine 
‘floor’ and ‘ceiling’ revenue levels for the infrastructure under its jurisdiction, and 
these are based on some form of a cost-based ‘building-block’ approach (see ACCC, 
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1995) which takes into account the incremental costs of service for the floor and full 
economic costs for the ceiling.  The most important difference is the way in which 
asset values are calculated; all adopt the Depreciated Optimised Replacement Cost 
methodology, except the Economic Regulation Authority (ERA) in WA which uses 
the Gross Replacement Value method.2  All have adopted a ‘negotiate-arbitrate’ 
regulatory model, though each has its own process to trigger regulatory intervention, 
with some acting prior to an access request, and some acting ex-post, only when 
access negotiations have failed.  Some railways (the ARTC and QR) have included 
reference tariffs to guide negotiations in their access arrangements, and these have 
been accepted by regulators.  To date, only Victoria has required reference tariffs, 
which must be calculated by a methodology determined by the regulator.  
 
Greater consistency through regular contact amongst regulators can only go so far, as 
each is limited by the legislation under which it operates.  There have thus been calls 
to change this legislation.  The topic was dealt with in some detail in the recent 
Productivity Commission investigation of road and rail infrastructure pricing (PC, 
2006), which supported greater consistency, and also in the Exports and Infrastructure 
Taskforce (2005), which made similar conclusions.3  The response by government 
came in February 2006, with the release of the Competition and Infrastructure Reform 
Agreement (CoAG, 2006).  Under this agreement, policymakers have agreed the 
following in respect to third party access: 
• To consider the introduction of price monitoring, rather than price regulation, in 
certain circumstances where this would be effective. 
• All third party access agreements should include object clauses to promote 
economic efficiency in the operation of and investment in infrastructure. 
• Agreements should have simple and consistent principles defining access prices. 
• Pricing should allow the recovery of efficient returns and incentives for 
productivity improvements.  Multi-part pricing and price discrimination should 
also be permitted, but steps should be taken to ensure a vertically-integrated 
monopolist cannot price in such a way as to favour its downstream arm. 
• Nationally significant interstate rail infrastructure should adopt consistent access 
regimes based on that of the ARTC and similar intrastate infrastructure should do 
the same where there are benefits from doing so. 
• Time limits for reviews of six months, except in extenuating circumstances. 
• Provision should be made for merit reviews of regulatory decisions. 
• All State-based regimes should be submitted for certification by the NCC by the 
end of 2010. 
• Where governments are creating infrastructure with natural monopoly 
components, they should consider competitive tendering to reduce the need for 
subsequent regulation. 
 
On April 13th 2007, CoAG met again, and the National Reform Agenda was refined 
further.4  Amendments to Clause Six of the Competition Principles Agreement,5 
                                                 
2 See http://www.era.wa.gov.au/3/235/48/grv_vs_dorc.pm for a comparison of the two methodologies. 
3 Note that neither advocates that all railway access regimes should be the same.  The Productivity 
Commission (2006) in particular, devotes considerable space to both sides of the debate.  BTRE (2006) 
also discusses the issue of fragmentation and centralisation at length, incorporating safety and 
occupational health and safety regulation into the analysis. 
4 Substantive details pertaining to this agreement can be found at 
http://www.coag.gov.au/meetings/130407/docs/coag_nra_competition_reforms.pdf  
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which implement the above dot points were agreed upon, along with a timetable for 
their implementation.  A timeframe was also developed for the review of the various 
State access regimes, such that they could be certified by 2010.  To date, only 
Queensland has made substantial progress in this regard, recently releasing 
amendments to its Queensland Competition Authority Act 1997 for comment.6  More 
specific to rail, CoAG agreed on a target date of December 2008 to implement a 
consistent system of rail access to agreed interstate and major intrastate freight 
corridors.  At the same time, CoAG working groups are investigating the possibility 
of adapting the existing ARTC access undertaking to cover both vertically integrated 
and vertically separated railways.7  The interstate network to be covered includes the 
track owned by the ARTC as well as track operated by WestNet between Perth and 
Kalgoorlie and by QR between Brisbane and the NSW border.  CoAG intends to 
explore means of bringing the latter two sections of track under a national system of 
regulation (at present, each is regulated at the State level) through a process of 
commercial negotiation.  Major intrastate freight routes have yet to be identified, and 
process of case-by-case identification is due to start in December 2007.  A working 
group within CoAG has been working on these issues, and is set to continue to do so. 
 
Policymakers appear to be moving rather quickly towards a centralised solution.  The 
position of industry is rather different.  Initially, much of the pressure for greater 
consistency came from industry.  Federal Treasury thus approached the Australasian 
Railway Association to examine industry views on what kind of a consistent set of 
regulations industry might prefer at the beginning of 2007. 
 
However, recent consultations with industry suggest consistent economic regulations 
is no longer a major issue.  There are some concerns that the national regulation of 
‘major intrastate freight corridors’ would actually increase the regulatory burden for 
many operators, who ship freight along branch-lines and then onto main-lines as it 
approaches ports for export.  At present, most of these operators face just one State 
regime, but the CoAG process outlined above would mean they would face two.  
NSW already faces this issue on some of its track through the lease of much of its 
intrastate track to the ARTC, and other States are loath to follow its example. 
 
Industry appears to be more concerned about what is in access regulations rather than 
whether they are consistent with each other or not.  However, industry players are 
somewhat divided on the question of what an ideal access regime should contain.  
This is unsurprising, given the diversity of interests within the industry and highlights 
the need to consider in more detail the process by which consistency is achieved.  As 
argued in the concluding sections of this paper, if policymakers move too far ahead of 
industry needs in regards to consolidation then the balance between centralisation and 
fragmentation may no longer be appropriate for industry.  
                                                                                                                                            
5 Which deals with the interaction between and content of State and Federal access regimes.  See 
http://www.ncc.gov.au/activity.asp?activityID=39 for details. 
6 See http://www.treasury.qld.gov.au/office/services/regulatory-reform/qcaaat-review.shtml for details. 
7 These two types of railways have quite different incentives; vertically integrated railways have an 
incentive to foreclose access to downstream rivals through high prices and/or restrictive conditions, 
whilst vertically separated railways do not.  Thus, vertically integrated railways generally require 
stricter access conditions than their vertically separated peers.  It is unclear why, CoAG has sought to 
lump these two very different types of railway together, nor quite how it intends to do so. 
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Costs and Benefits of the Current System and Striking a Balance 
Both the Productivity Commission (2006) and the Bureau of Transport and Regional 
Economics (2006) provide detailed accounts of the costs and benefits of 
fragmentation versus centralisation of governance structures in Australia’s railway 
system.  This section of the paper highlights some issues from the perspective of the 
trade-off between centralisation and fragmentation.  The current fragmented system in 
Australia has three obvious and immediate costs.  For rail operators seeking to cross 
Australia, the plethora of regulators mean that access to each section of railway track 
in different jurisdictions may be on different terms, increasing the costs of traffic.  For 
the regulators themselves, multiple regulatory offices with their associated support 
staff may represent wasteful use of resources.  Thirdly, for the industry as a whole, 
multiple regulators raise the risk of divergence and potentially contradictory regimes 
which may hamper the development of national rail systems. 
 
There are also, however, two key benefits.  The first of these is proximity of interest.  
A regulator located closer to the regulated entity and with fewer responsibilities over 
other firms is more likely to be receptive to the idiosyncrasies of the particular firm 
being regulated than a more distant regulator with a wider portfolio of firms being 
regulated.  Such a distant regulator is more likely to seeks points of commonality in a 
‘one-size-fits-all’ solution to regulatory problems.  At the very least, it will consider 
the ramifications of a decision which takes into account the idiosyncrasies of one 
railway on its other regulatory decisions.  Perhaps more importantly, railways seldom 
stand alone, but rather sit within logistics chains.  If other elements of these chains 
(roads and ports, for example) are managed by a local or regional level of government 
and the railway at the Federal level, this could lead to mis-coordination in the 
governance of the chain as a whole.  The current CoAG proposals for nationally 
significant intrastate routes (see above) are especially troubling from this perspective, 
as they would actually increase the regulatory burden for many rail users, who cross 
from branch lines to track designated as nationally significant.  This is why examining 
railways from a functional perspective is particularly useful.   
 
The second is the possibility, with numerous regulators, for experimentation in 
different approaches.  This has proved very useful in Australia.  When third party 
access regimes were first created, they differed from State to State more widely than 
they do today.  In particular, the regime in Victoria was particularly light-handed, 
with loosely defined roles for the regulator.  The reason for this was that most of the 
freight task in Victoria was associated with export grain, which was hauled by the 
vertically integrated incumbent.  It was considered by policymakers that ancillary, 
small freight tasks being sought by third parties could be relatively easily 
accommodated by commercial negotiation.  However, in 2001, GrainCorp, the major 
customer of the incumbent railway operator, decided to operate its own trains, and 
sought access, very much against the wishes of the railway operator.  The result was 
several years of delay and confusion.  The light-handed Victorian regulatory regime 
proved entirely unsuitable for the task of determining how an access regime would be 
structured; the price determination process was opaque and complex, and the 
regulator lacked the requisite powers to obtain information from the railway operator.  
The railway was sold to another company, and the case eventually resulted in Victoria 
promulgating a new regime (based upon the more successful regimes of WA and 
Queensland) in January 2006.  Victoria has a relatively small share of the overall rail 
freight task, which limited the impacts of the imbroglio.  If all of Australia had been 
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covered by the same regulatory regime as in Victoria, the consequences for the rail 
industry would have been substantial.  Fragmentation gave the regulators 
opportunities to learn from each other, and improve their systems. 
 
In reality, a trade-off exists; railways are neither so similar that all can be governed 
under the same regime (or under several regimes which are all the same), nor is each 
railway so different that it requires an entirely different regulatory regime.  The use of 
State and Federal control allows policymakers to reflect differences between railways 
in a potentially useful manner.  However, simply installing a Federal regime and 
several State regimes is insufficient and may lead to little more than wasteful 
duplication of oversight.  Worse still, there does not appear to be a generalisable, 
practical way to determine which agencies should regulate which aspects of the 
railways (in a third-party access sense).  It is partly for this reason that the paper 
considers the functional task of Australia’s railways.  However, what is clear is that a 
balance-point does exist between over-centralisation and over-fragmentation.  The 
lesson from the long history of rail and public policy is that, rather than looking for 
the balance-point itself, policymakers would do better to develop an institutional 
framework within which it can be found.  This historical lesson is outlined below.  
Governing Railways in a Federation in History 
Australia today is not unique in facing a situation where railways are beginning to 
cross State borders.  In fact, Australia has faced a similar issue in the past.  The 
railways of the 19th Century were owned by the colonial governments.8  Moreover, 
pricing was directly controlled by government, and ultimately the ballot-box, so 
pressures such as the Granger Movement (see below) did not arise.  There was, 
however, pressure for some form of supra-State control over the railways at the time 
of Australia’s Federation, which meant that railways played a large part in the 
constitutional debates in the decade preceding Federation (some 304 pages of debate, 
according to Maskell, 1982), and that three sections of the Constitution (102 to 104) 
were devoted to an Interstate Commission, which was intended to provide (limited) 
Federal oversight of the State railways. 
 
The pressures came from a series of acrimonious disputes which had flared up as the 
railways reached the colonial borders and began to “poach” freight from other 
colonies.  The disputes were fiercest in the Riverina region, where Victoria, NSW and 
SA each competed to export the agricultural produce of the region using very low 
freight rates to do so (see Clark, 1908, for a detailed account).  The problem for the 
colonial governments was that there seemed to be no way out of the prisoners’ 
dilemma they had created for themselves at the borders, and they hoped that Federal 
oversight (suitably circumscribed so as not to subvert their development policies) 
might provide a way out of the dilemma.  US railways sought the same kind of 
stability from regulation (see below). 
 
The Interstate Commission was not founded until 1912, and did not rule on any 
railway cases during its short life.9  However, this did not adversely affect the 
railways because they had by then discovered another way out of their prisoners’ 
dilemma (also attempted by US railways, but with less success); they formed a cartel 
                                                 
8 As is the case today, there were some private rail links, especially at borders. 
9 See Stevenson (1987) for details, including the reformation of the Commission in the 1980s 
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to control pricing at the borders, and thus took the heat out of the railway price wars.  
This took two attempts, one in 1895, which the Victorian government overruled, and 
one in 1905 which was more successful.  Clark (1908) provides further details. 
 
In 1905, with only a small amount of cross-border traffic, direct government control 
of the railways and no Trade Practices Act, a cartel was perhaps a useful solution for 
the governance of interstate traffic.  However, such collusion is unlikely to be either 
acceptable or effective today.  For this reason, it is more useful to concentrate on a 
different experience of governing railways within a Federal system; that of the US 
over the 50 year period (roughly 1870 until the 1920s), during which it developed a 
governance system for its railways incorporating both State and Federal oversight.  
This history is discussed below. 
United States and the Movement to Federal Regulation 
The early experience of the nexus between government and business in the context of 
railways in the US did not augur well for the future of railway governance.  Whilst the 
private sector largely built the railways of the US, Federal, State and local 
governments provided significant cash and land grants as incentives to speed railway 
construction.  This lead to rapid development of the railways, but it also lead to 
overcapacity, lines with unviable traffic and a considerable amount of fraud and 
corruption.  This latter aspect caused the public to be highly sceptical of any form of 
government involvement in the railways (see Dobbin, 1994). 
 
However, the behaviour of the railway barons did little to endear them to popular 
opinion either.  With their high sunk costs, railways inevitably (and efficiently, see 
Ramsey, 1927 and Boiteaux, 1971) engage in some form of price discrimination.  
However, in order to cover the costs of marginal lines and the consequence of intense 
competition on routes between cities, the railway barons raised prices considerably on 
the lines to rural hinterlands where they held a monopoly, compared to the lines 
between cities where they competed with other railways.  Since this involved different 
charges for essentially the same service, it was met with great hostility.  Moreover, it 
was clear that the common law was insufficient for dealing with grievances associated 
with this discrimination, largely because of the vast disparity in the financial 
resources railway operators could bring to a court case, compared with their 
customers.  This led, eventually, to Americans choosing an increased role for 
government oversight of the railways, as the lesser of two evils.  The progress was 
slow and carefully considered, which makes it illuminating for policymakers today. 
 
The first regulatory commissions were established in the New England States, 
beginning with Massachusetts in 1838, and spreading to all of these States by the 
1860s.  These commissions, often established in response to complaints about railway 
rates, had relatively limited powers.  They could undertake investigations and publish 
their results, but they could not compel the railways.  Instead, they relied upon moral 
suasion based on the reasoning that if the misdeeds of the railways were sufficiently 
egregious, the relevant local community would deal with the misdeed via legislation. 
 
For many customers, particularly farmers facing high rates from monopoly railways, 
this was insufficient.  In 1867, a group of farmers formed the National Grange of the 
Order of the Patrons of Husbandry (or Grangers) to address the concerns of farmers at 
the political level.  A major concern was discriminatory railway rates.  The 
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movement, which still exists,10 grew rapidly, with membership rising to 800,000 by 
1875.  In the late 1860s, they gained control of the legislature in Illinois, Iowa, 
Minnesota and Wisconsin, and began passing legislation to control railway prices 
through regulatory commissions.  Illinois created the first of these commissions in 
1869.  Minnesota followed in 1871, and Iowa and Wisconsin in 1874.  By 1886, 25 
States had such commissions, and further five controlled railway prices by legislation.  
The new commissions were much more powerful than their New England peers, most 
particularly in their ability to set prices.  
 
The response of the railways was to either work around the commissions by 
subverting the (often poorly drafted) legislation, or to challenge the authority of the 
commissions in the courts.  These challenges, doubtless irksome to policymakers at 
the time, were crucial to the development of robust regulatory practice.  The first 
challenge related to the right of government to regulate business.  In a series of cases 
in 1877, the Supreme Court found that government did in fact have this power for 
businesses which were ‘clothed in the public interest’.  Dunbar (1895) provides a 
detailed account of these cases.  The second challenge was based on the 14th 
Amendment to the US Constitution which forbad the deprivation of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law; an amendment originally made to protect 
Negroes under slavery.  The railways argued that regulation was a taking of property 
without due process of law, but the Supreme Court disagreed (again, Dunbar, 1895 
provides details).  It did, however, set limits on what regulators could do, requiring 
them to provide ‘fair and reasonable’ compensation on a ‘fair valuation’ of assets.  
Determining fairness was a task the Court believed best left to the executive, not the 
judiciary, which was ill-equipped for this administrative task.  It became a key role for 
the regulatory commissions, who developed ‘scientific’ methods to value assets which 
were almost identical to the building block approach (see ACCC, 1995) used by 
Australian regulators today.  Virtue (1909) outlines the approach and 
contemporaneous criticisms of it. 
 
The one challenge that the State regulators could not meet however, was the 
contention by the railways that State regulation was impeding interstate commerce.  
By 1866, almost three-quarters of railway traffic was interstate traffic (Pegrum, 1973), 
and it was very difficult for State regulation not to affect such traffic.  After a series of 
cases (see Morrow, 1959 for details), the Supreme Court found in the Wabash case of 
1886 that the States could not regulate interstate commerce, and hence interstate 
railway rates.  This created a vacuum into which the Federal Government had to step. 
 
During the 1870s and 1880s, the Federal Government had not been idle.  On the 
legislative front, more than 150 bills to regulate the railways had been considered by 
Congress (Dobbin, 1994), but none had passed both chambers.  The difficulty was 
that the House and the Senate each had different priorities, due largely to the 
influence of railway lobbying in the Senate and shipper lobbying in the House.   
 
At the same time, the Federal Government was developing an administrative capacity 
in regulation within the General Land Office (GLO), established to resolve competing 
land claims from the various land grant schemes associated with the railways.  
Although it had no Congressional mandate to do so, the GLO developed a highly 
                                                 
10 See http://www.nationalgrange.org/  
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sophisticated arbitration system for disputes, using its own previous decisions as 
precedent and the Attorney General for advice in difficult cases.  The system was 
often preferred by the railways to the Courts and gave business some confidence that 
the Federal Government would be able to regulate competently. 
 
The railways, too, were changing their views towards regulation.  In particular, by the 
mid 1870s, the railways had finally found a solution to the ruinous competition on 
rates between cities; they had formed “pools” or cartels (see Kolko, 1965, Hudson, 
1890 and MacAvoy, 1965 for details).  However, like any collusive agreement, they 
found the pool prices hard to maintain, and continued with secret discounts for 
favoured customers.  They hoped that regulation might give legal force to the pools, 
and they began to lobby in the Senate to this end.  Gilligan, Marshall & Weingast 
(1989) provide an account of the different interest groups and their impacts on the 
formation of Federal rail regulation. 
 
Thus, during the latter half of the 1880s, the relevant stars were aligned for the 
formation of Federal regulatory oversight of US railways.  In February 1887, 
Congress finally passed the Act to Regulate Commerce, and created the Interstate 
Commerce Commission (ICC).  The ICC consisted of five commissioners.  It could 
hear complaints, determine damages, inquire into railway management and require the 
railways to produce annual data.11  It could not impose sanctions if a railway ignored 
its directives, but instead had to take its case to court.  This involvement of the Courts 
was quite deliberate, according to Gilligan et al (1989).  The shippers realised that 
they would not be able to hold together as a coalition after the legislation had passed 
as well as the railways could.  Thus, they were concerned that the railways might 
come to dominate a regulatory commission with wide discretionary powers.  For this 
reason, they favoured the Courts as arbiters, with easily determined tests.  The Act to 
Regulate Commerce contained clauses: 
• Addressing the reasonableness of rates. 
• Outlawing personal discrimination. 
• Prohibiting preference or prejudice. 
• Prohibiting higher rates for short haul over long haul under similar circumstances. 
• Prohibiting pooling (a major political loss for the railways). 
• Requiring all rates to be public and published. 
 
Over the next two decades, the Supreme Court challenged many of the weaker clauses 
in the Act,12 finding against the ICC in 15 of the 16 cases brought before it.  The ICC 
lost many of its powers, including its raison detre; the ability to prescribe rates.  
However, just as had occurred with State regulation previously, this highlighted to 
policymakers better ways to structure legislation, and most of these powers were 
returned (and additional powers added) in the decade before the First World War.13  
                                                 
11 An aspect sorely lacking in modern Australian regulation, of all industries. 
12 This is a strength, not a weakness, of the US system, for it ensures rigorous testing of new laws.  The 
State regulatory laws were subject to the same tests, and most of the “Granger Laws” failed.  However, 
they developed important principles which were used in later generations of regulation. 
13 Through the Elkins Act 1903, the Hepburn Act 1906, the Mann-Elkins Act 1910 and the Valuation 
Act 1913. 
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State vs Federal Regulators in the US 
The arrival of Federal regulation did not mean the departure of the State regulatory 
agencies.  Indeed, in the first decade of the 20th Century, when the powers of the ICC 
were expanded, some 39 States either strengthened their regulatory agencies, or 
created new ones, beginning with New York and Wisconsin in 1905.  These State 
agencies were often methodologically ahead of the ICC.  For example, the “scientific” 
method of valuing all assets used in common carriage undertaken by the ICC as part 
of the Valuation Act 1913 had its origins in the State regulators in Wisconsin, 
Minnesota and Michigan (Virtue, 1909).  State regulators also maintained control 
over intrastate rail issues, including rates.  However, from the perspective of this 
paper, the interesting issue is how State and Federal regulators interacted in order to 
find a balance between over-centralisation and over-fragmentation of governance.   
 
Just as was the case in developing robust regulation, a key catalyst in finding the 
balance between State and Federal regulatory control was the courts.  Immediately 
there were two regulators, the railways endeavoured to play them off against each 
other, by suggesting that different rates on similar track governed at different levels of 
government represented discrimination.  These disputes made their way to the 
Supreme Court, and three cases in particular assisted in finding a balance point.14  
The first of these was the Minnesota Rates Case of 1913, whereby the State regulator 
had passed rulings on intrastate rates which indirectly affected interstate rates as well.  
The Supreme Court ruled that this was acceptable, as the effects were indirect, and the 
interstate rates had in any case not been set by the ICC.  The second was the 
Shreveport Case of 1914.  Here the disputants were the State regulators, with 
Louisiana complaining that the rates set by the Texas Railway Commission for lines 
inside Texas (from Houston and Dallas to jobbing centres in the East) favoured 
shippers in Texas over those in Louisiana, who faced the higher interstate rates set by 
the ICC and were hence less able to compete for overseas freight coming through the 
region.  In this instance, the Supreme Court found that the ICC did have the right to 
correct discrepancies in rates set by it and a State regulator, but did not say how this 
might be achieved.  The issue was not finally solved until 1922.  The third case was 
over passenger fares in Wisconsin in 1922, where the State regulator refused to follow 
the ICC upwards in allowable rates.  In this instance, the Court ruled that the ICC did 
have the power to require intrastate rates to be changed, but it specifically stated that 
this was not a general power.  Moreover, it stated that cases of discrepancy should 
only be brought before it when they were substantial, and enjoined the State and 
Federal regulators to work more closely together. 
 
Of the three cases, Childs (2001) singles out the Shreveport case, not for what it said, 
but what it forced the State regulators to do.  Within two years of the Shreveport case, 
there were 100 similar cases, which could obviously not be resolved by the Supreme 
Court fine-tuning where the boundaries between Federal and State authority lay.  The 
key to the solution was to move away from the issue of who should regulate what.  At 
a meeting of its regulators forum in 1916,15 the head of the Association BH Meyer 
                                                 
14 Childs (2001) and Pegrum (1973) each provide a detailed account of these three cases. 
15 The National Association of Railroad Commissioners (from 1917, the National Association of 
Railway and Utilities Commissioners).  This body was created in 1889, at the urging of the first chair 
of the ICC, Judge Thomas Cooley, who was a constitutional lawyer, and realised the difficulties of 
drawing lines of demarcation between State and Federal oversight of the railways, and envisioned 
ameliorating these difficulties by getting railway regulators to work together. 
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suggested that the best approach would be to side-step the Constitutional issue 
altogether, as it was too hard to resolve.  Instead, he suggested, the ICC and the State 
regulators should work together to ensure that rates were reasonable and discrepancies 
fewer and hence reducing the potential for cases to come to court.  This process was 
formalised in March 1922 and later became a model for other regulated industries 
facing the same issue.  Childs (2001) refers to it as “pragmatic federalism”, and 
argues that it improved the development of US regulatory policy. 
 
The lesson for Australia today is clear; constructive co-operation in an evolutionary 
approach is preferable to the impossibility of devising a generalisable balance point.  
This evolutionary approach requires a focus on the institutional structures surrounding 
railways.  In the US in the early 20th Century, one had the Federal and State 
regulatory agencies on the one hand, each vying for a role (particularly the State 
regulators, who were dogmatically endeavouring to avoid being eclipsed).  On the 
other hand, one had railway operators seeking to exploit any differences between the 
two to their advantage.  In between, one had the courts, which sought to force the 
regulatory agencies to minimise their differences in a way useful to business.  
Although the results were not perfect (see Childs, 2001), the institutional structures 
and behaviour of the actors resulted in an evolutionary approach towards an 
acceptable balance point for each of the railways concerned.   
 
Although much of the institutional structure used by the US exists in Australia today, 
what seems lacking is a better perspective on the scope of the problem being 
addressed.  Australia today is different from the US in the 19th Century because it has 
a much smaller interstate rail haulage task.  To obtain a better perspective on the scale 
of the problem, it is useful to examine the haulage task of Australia’s railways. 
The Haulage Task of Australia’s Railways 
Australia’s rail haulage task is quite different from that of the US a century ago.  In 
particular, only a quarter of the current Australian haulage task is interstate freight 
(see Figure Two).  Thus, the governance structure required in Australia is likely to be 
different to that which developed in the US, with a more prevalent State role.  To 
explore this further, it is useful to study the composition of rail haulage in Australia, 
and examine what each of the major haulage tasks requires from the perspective of 
third party access to track and its governance at a Sate or Federal level.  Figure One 
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Comparing freight and passenger traffic on the basis of quantity is difficult,16 and thus 
Figure One includes both quantity and revenue data.  On the basis of quantity carried, 
                                                 
16 A very crude measure is to consider an average person weighing between 60 and 70 kg, and convert 
passenger kilometres to net tonne kilometres (ntk), the measure used for freight.  By this measure, 
passenger traffic accounts for less than one percent of freight traffic.   
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passenger freight is less important than freight.  On the basis of revenue, the two are 
roughly equal.  However, their sources of revenue are quite different; only one fifth of 
passenger revenues are collected from passengers themselves and more than half is 
collected from government.  By contrast, freight rail customers pay almost the entire 
cost of their services directly.  Within freight rail haulage, coal and ores clearly 
dominate, with intermodal freight a distant third.  Grain accounts for only a very small 
proportion of the overall freight task, but uses a large amount of rail infrastructure. 
 
In Australia, economic regulation of railways pertains to access to track infrastructure, 
rather than the price of haulage services, as in the US case study above.  Obviously, in 
some cases, a piece of track infrastructure will have multiple uses.  However, it is 
useful to examine the characteristics of each rail freight task as they pertain to third 
party access first, and then to return to points of potential conflict. 
Commuter Rail 
Each commuter rail task occurs entirely within the boundaries of a city and each city 
is heterogeneous; the needs of Sydney are quite different from the need of Perth, for 
example.  A system of regulatory governance seeking consistency between these 
disparate cities would be very difficult to create and there would be few economies of 
scale from having a single regulator governing all capital cities because different 
regulation would be required for each.  Moreover, the commuter rail system in each 
city is integral to other forms of public transport, and part of the overall land-use 
planning framework of that city.  Federal control of one part of the land-use planning 
system in a complex city and State control of the remainder seems difficult to co-
ordinate.  There thus seems to be little that is gained from having Federal governance 
of commuter rail infrastructure, or even forcing each State to adopt the same set of 
regulatory protocols; each city is quite different and should be able to operate as such. 
 
Indeed, it is questionable as to whether third party access is useful for commuter rail.  
The service barely covers its operating costs, and hence it is unclear what sort of 
monopoly abuses the public is being protected from by third party access.  Moreover, 
the main goals of a commuter rail system are unrelated to profits at all; they are rather 
concerned with reducing congestion and pollution, and ensuring the efficient 
movement of large numbers of people around a city.  In order to do this, the rail 
system needs to exploit its network economies, which could be difficult within a third 
party access regime and competition for passengers between railway operators.  For 
this reason, attempts to introduce competition in commuter rail have tended to focus 
on competitive tenders for concessions, rather than competition on the railway itself. 
Bulk Minerals and Grain 
Bulk minerals and grain, although very different as freight tasks, share common 
characteristics from the perspective of State or Federal governance of infrastructure.  
In each case, the logistics chains of which rail forms a part sit almost entirely within 
the borders of a single state.  Moreover, in each case, the other elements of each 
logistics chain (roads, ports and so on) also sit within the borders of the State 
concerned.  The logistics chains are planned at the State level, as is underlying 
industrial development policy.  This is especially the case with grain, which is tied up 
in the economics and politics of regional development policies.  National or 
Consistent State governance of one link in these logistics chains would reduce 
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markedly the flexibility with which each State could effect its development policies.17  
There thus seems a strong argument for retaining governance in State hands. 
 
Again, the argument for third party access on lines servicing minerals and (more 
particularly) grain is weak.  This is discussed in more detail in Wills-Johnson (2007) 
and in the Exports and Infrastructure Taskforce (2005), which advocates that 
regulation be applied to export logistics chains ‘sparingly’.18   
Intermodal Freight 
Intermodal freight is quite different from other freight tasks.  In general, it is only 
economical to use rail (compared with trucks) over long distances.  Thus, intermodal 
rail freight is predominantly interstate in nature.  Figure Two shows the proportion of 
interstate and intrastate intermodal freight in Australia. 
 






















































































































































As a proportion of total freight, interstate freight is relatively small; overall, some 
three-quarters of freight is intrastate and just one-quarter is interstate.  However, when 
                                                 
17 Giving governance of part of a rail route used by grain and minerals traffic to a Federal agency 
whilst keeping the remainder in State hands (as CoAG suggests) is, as discussed above, even worse. 
18 The Productivity Commission (2006) also argues that regulation be scaled back, but advocates its 
continuation on coal chains due to concerns about rail’s monopoly position. 
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the one analyses bulk and intermodal freight separately, the two are almost polar 
opposites; around 80 percent of bulk freight is intrastate and around 80 percent of 
intermodal freight is interstate. 
 
Not only is intermodal freight predominantly interstate, but it also often feeds into 
markets where the logistics chain can earn monopoly rents (see Wills-Johnson, 2007, 
for a more detailed discussion).  Since rail can earn monopoly rents, third party access 
is potentially justified.19  Where intermodal freight is predominantly interstate, it 
seems most likely that Federal control would be optimal (absent of any issues with 
existing track leases); a process towards which CoAG appears to be moving.  
However, where the intermodal freight is intrastate, because these lines are also used 
by grain and minerals traffic which accesses them from branch lines currently subject 
to State control, Federal regulation would result in two layers of regulation where 
previously there was one (and perhaps optimally there is none).  Thus, there seems to 
be little to recommend Federal control of major intrastate routes, such as the South-
West Main in Western Australia; this part of the Competition and Infrastructure 
Reform Agreement seems flawed. 
 
The solution of Federally regulated intermodal traffic has largely been instituted 
already.  One entity, the ARTC manages almost all of the track in Australia upon 
which interstate, intermodal freight is carried, and it is regulated at the Federal level 
by the ACCC.20  However, four important exceptions remain: 
• Brisbane to the NSW border (operated by Queensland rail and regulated by the 
Queensland Competition Authority). 
• Perth to Kalgoorlie (operated by Westnet Rail and regulated by the WA Economic 
Regulation Authority). 
• Parts of the interstate network within the Sydney Metropolitan Commuter 
Network (owned by Railcorp and regulated by the Independent Pricing and 
Regulatory Tribunal). 
• The Tarcoola to Darwin Railway (operated by Freightlink and regulated by the SA 
Essential Services Commission). 
 
The first two of these lines are already part of a CoAG process, discussed previously, 
which may lead to their inclusion in a national regime, depending upon the outcome 
of commercial negotiation.  The track within Sydney should arguably not come under 
Federal control, or be subject to an access regime designed to be consistent with 
freight railways elsewhere (like that of the ARTC).  Although freight might be 
inconvenienced by the operations of a system designed to service commuters first, the 
cost to freight of such an arrangement is likely to be much smaller than the potential 
costs which might arise if the access regime interrupts with the smooth operations of a 
complex commuter rail system such as that which operates in Sydney.  The issue is in 
any case likely to be alleviated somewhat by the construction of the South Sydney 
                                                 
19 An appropriate assessment would be the amount of rents potentially available to rail on a given route, 
compared to the cost of regulating that route. 
20 Much of this network is governed under the ARTC’s 2002 Access Undertaking.  In 2004, the ARTC 
entered into an agreement with the NSW State Government to lease a large portion of its intrastate 
track, and it submitted an access undertaking for this track in June 2007.  The undertaking was 
withdrawn in October 2007, but the ARTC stated it intended to resubmit in future (although not stated 
in its reasons, this seems likely to be due to the activities of CoAG discussed previously).  Further 
details available at http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/789738/fromItemId/756997 . 
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Freight Corridor, which is specifically designed to avoid conflicts between freight and 
commuter passenger rail.  Finally, the terms of the Tarcoola to Darwin Railway 
access undertaking were developed when the railway was built, to satisfy the 
requirements of the private financial partners of this public-private partnership.  The 
undertaking is different from access arrangements elsewhere in Australia, most 
especially due to the use of the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (see Albon, 2007 
for a recent critique), but these differences would remain regardless of whether the 
regulator was a State or Federal agency, because of the private-public partnership 
arrangements.    
Points of Conflict 
The above characterisation is not the entire story as a piece of railway infrastructure is 
often used by more than one haulage task, which gives rise to a potential conflict if 
one task is bets governed Federally and the other at the State level.  The key issue is 
how much track is actually shared by tasks which are best governed by different 
levels of government.  A detailed review is beyond the scope this paper (but is worth 
doing nonetheless), but most of the conflict would appear to arise around major ports, 
which are used both by interstate intermodal freight and bulk freight.  In other cases, 
particularly if third party access is removed where it is not particularly useful, the 
scope for conflict seems rather limited. 
 
If the scope for conflict is limited, the CoAG approach of seeking consistency across 
the whole railway system seems overwrought.  It also appears to be moving towards 
too much consistency, as evinced by the attempts to bring vertically integrated and 
vertically separated railways under a single type of access undertaking.   
 
More important than the drive to consistency is the way in which it is being handled.  
Whilst industry is being consulted, the driving force is within government.  The end 
result will doubtless b some diversity in regulation, either in the access regimes 
developed, or in the regulatory structures used, or both.  However, the degree and 
nature of diversity will reflect political and administrative tractability amongst the 
CoAG parties working on consistent rail access regulation.  These differences are not 
guaranteed to be the points of differences which are optimal from the perspective of 
the efficient operation of the railways.  For this to occur requires far more 
involvement from industry; not just through being consulted, but through actively 
challenging government policymakers and through seeking to play of State and 
Federal agencies against each other in the courts, as occurred in the US.  The end 
result is likely to be co-operation, as occurs today between regulators.  However, the 
dynamic of that co-operation would be different, due to its being driven by industry 
challenges of government.  Such challenges are irksome to policymakers and time-
consuming for the policy-making process.  However, they contribute to robust 
regulation.  A new dynamic based on industry challenge could begin with the CoAG 
proposal to bring interstate links under national regulation through a process of 
commercial negotiation, and through the assessment of intrastate links as to their 
suitability for national regulation. 
 
Fostering this environment of challenge requires a different approach from 
policymakers.  Rather than a technocratic focus on where lines of demarcation should 
be drawn and precisely what should go into the holy text of a unified access 
undertaking which can be applied to all track in Australia, the focus should instead be 
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institutional.  In particular, examining how the courts, the Federal and State regulatory 
agencies and industry can be brought together in a useful conflict which results in the 
evolution of robust regulatory practice.  This institutional focus has, to date, been 
lacking, as has the willingness (the Pilbara notwithstanding) of the railway industry to 
more robustly challenge policymakers to prove the worth of their policy prescriptions. 
Conclusions 
This paper has examined the economic governance of railways, which in Australia 
pertains to the provision of third party access, from an historical and a function 
perspective.  The historical perspective is useful because it shows that there is no 
single ‘right’ answer, but rather that the solution lies in creating an appropriate 
institutional framework within which the tensions between centralisation and 
fragmentation can be usefully played out.  This is likely an irksome conclusion for 
Australian policymakers, attuned to the delivery of ‘right answers’ through devout 
belief in neoclassical economics.  However, it is the sort of conclusion that Sen (1995) 
and other scholars of social choice theory might support. 
 
The functional perspective is useful because it highlights the scale of the problem 
which is of issue.  One is not talking about the whole system, but rather a few points 
of conflict, mostly around major ports.  Thus, solutions should not be overwrought in 
their complexity when the scale of the problem is relatively small.  
 
The solution in fact involves using the institutional framework which exists at present 
(the diversity of economic regulators, the railway operators and the courts) to institute 
an evolutionary process towards greater consistency with a different dynamic to that 
which exists within the current CoAG framework.  In particular, greater involvement 
by industry is required in challenging the government, rather than being consulted by 
it. This allows governance frameworks to develop in a more robust fashion, and 
ensures that the patterns of heterogeneity which remain at the end of the process 
reflect what the industry requires, and not political tractability.  The process is 
perhaps longer, and definitely messier than the sedate process of management within 
government.  However, like sausages, the formation of good governance is not 
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